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How officialsterilized(non-monetary)foreign exchange market inter-
vention may influence the exchange rate by changing the relative supply
ofgovernment bonds denominated in domestic andforeign currencies is
shown in this paper. Recent Japanese experience is investigated in the
contextofa simple asset market modelofexchange rate determination.
The empirical estimates suggest that Japanese official intervention has
had only a small influence on the real value ofthe yen-dollar exchange
rate largely because its impact was dwarfed by the role oflarge fiscal
deficits in changing the relative supplyofgovernmentbonds.
The Williamsburg economic summit took place
last Spring amidst great concern over the general
strength and dramatic volatility of the dollar in
world currency markets. Amajor issue on the agen-
da was whether central banks should increase their
intervention in the foreign exchange market and
attempt both to hinder the dollar's climb and to
reduce its fluctuations. As a basis for discussion,
summit participants used the Report ofthe Working
Group on Exchange Market Intervention (the Jur-
gensen report) commissioned at the 1982 Versailles
summit. Although the report gave few policy
recommendations, it did help to identify the im-
portant issues and to clarify the meaning of inter-
vention. In particular, the Jurgensen report dis-
tinguished between "monetary" intervention and
"sterilized" intervention, and emphasized that the
effectiveness of central bank foreign exchange
market operations will largely depend upon the
distinction.
*Economist. Research assistance for the article was
provided by Mary~Ellen Burton-Christie. I have
benefitted from helpful comments from my col-
leagues in the FRBSF Research Department. I am
also indebtedto Steve Haynes, PeterHooper, Ralph
Langenborg, Raymond F. Mikesell and Joe Stone
for theircomments on earlier drafts ofthis paper.
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Official foreign exchange market intervention
may be viewed as a process through which the
central bank shifts the composition of its portfolio
between foreign and domestic assets. In the case of
monetary intervention, the central bank changes its
net foreign asset holdings through purchases and
sales offoreign exchange and allows a correspond-
ing change in its monetary liabilities, that is, the
monetary base (total reserves plus currency held by
the non-bank public). Sterilizedintervention, on the
other hand, means that the central bank allows the
change in its net foreign asset holdings to be offset
by a corresponding change in its net domestic
assets. Monetary liabilities of the central bank
remain unchanged in this case, and the monetary
base is "sterilized" from foreign exchange market
intervention operations. In both instances, foreign
assets held by the public will change. Monetized
intervention, however, will change the public's
holdings of base money, while sterilized interven-
tion will change the public's holdings ofdomestic
bonds.
Table I illustrates the effect of intervention on
asset supplies in more concrete terms. The table
shows a stylized central bank balance sheet and the
consolidated private sector claims on foreign and
domestic governments. The domestic central bank




Domestic Central Bank Balance Sheet
(B)
Consolidated Private SectorClaims on
Governments(Foreign and Domestic)
foreign government bonds, and has one liability,
domestic base money. (For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that central bank domestic credit equals
domestic bond holdings and that central bank net
foreign asset holdings equal net foreign bond hold-
ings). The consolidated private sector aggregates
the foreign private sector and the domestic private
sector and focuses on total claims on government,
that is, "outside" assets. Consolidated private sec-
tor claims onforeign and domestic governments are
distributed between domestic base money, foreign
base money, domestic government bonds and for-
eign government bonds.
Monetary foreign currency support intervention
occurs when the central bank purchases foreign
currency from the private sector with domestic cur-
rency, and in tum purchases a foreign bond with its
foreign exchange receipts. 1 The net effect on the
central bank balance sheet and private asset hold-
ings from this operation is indicated by (1) in Table
I. The central bank increases its holdings offoreign
bonds and increases domestic base money. Reflec-
ting the new composition of the central bank port-
folio, the private sector holds more domestic base
money andfewer domestic bonds.
With a stylizedcaseofsterilizedforeigncurrency
support intervention, the domestic centralbank fol-
lows all of the steps outlined above for monetary
intervention and then takes one additional step-it
sells a domestic bond in orderto hold domestic base
money unchanged. The net effect, shown by (2) in
Table I, is that the central bank holds more foreign
bonds and fewer domestic bonds, leaving base
money unchanged, while the private sector holds
fewer foreign bonds and more domestic bonds.
The Jurgensen report emphasized the distinction
between monetary and sterilized intervention be-
cause the form intervention takes will largely deter-
mine its effectiveness. Few disagree that monetary
intervention may have a significantinfluence on the
exchange rate. By changing base money, monetary
intervention will influence the broader money ag-
gregates, interest rates, and prices in the economy.
These variables are important determinants of
exchange rates. Sterilizedintervention, on the other
hand, amounts to a switch of a domestic (foreign)
bond for a foreign (domestic) bond held in private
portfolios. This form of intervention will only be
effective if investors view the bonds as less than
perfect substitutes, and relative yields adjust as a
consequence ofthe change in their relative supply.
The change in relative yields is the channel through
which sterilized intervention may exert an influence
on the exchange rate. The debate surrounding the
efficacy ofintervention thus largely concerns steril-
ized intervention, and the degree to which changes
in the distribution offoreign and domestic bonds in
private portfolios will influence relative yields.
A major difficulty facing the central bank, how-
ever, is that sterilized intervention is butone source
ofchange in the public's bondholdings. The saleof
government bonds to finance government budget
deficits will likely playa larger role than interven-
tion in determining the bond mix in private port-
folios. The public's domestic government bond
holdings (B) is determined by the interaction of
moneta.ry policy, government budget deficits, and
official exchange market intervention.·A govern-
ment budget deficit over any given period, for
example, must be financed by the private sector.
The government bond can be sold either to the
public or to the central bank. In the formercase,B






















28From equation (I), it is apparent that a domestic
bond sale either to finance a home-country budget
deficit, or to finance exchange market intervention
in support of the foreign currency will increase the
supply ofdomestic currency denominated bonds in
private portfolios. The ability ofthe central bank to
influence the relative supply ofbonds through ster-
ilized foreign exchange operations alone during any
given period will therefore be complicated by these
othersources ofsupply.
Purpose
This paper investigates the Japanese experience
with sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange
market over the 1973-82 floating rate period. The
Japanese case is particularly interesting both be-
cause the Bank of Japan pursues an active foreign
exchange market intervention policy-it is among
the most active of central bank participants in the
foreign exchange market-and because large cen-
tral government budget deficits have increased the
increase. On the other hand, B will also be influ-
enced by the central bank when it purchases orsells
domestic bonds in conducting monetary policy
through open market operations, even in the ab-
sence of current government budget deficits. In
short, thepublic'sdomestic bondholdingsequalthe
cumulative domestic budget deficit (fDEF) minus
cumulative open market purchases of government
bonds in exchangefordomestic base money (MB
d
)"
plus cumulative sales of home-country domestic
bonds by official foreign~exchange intervention
authorities (fINT), that is, sterilized intervention in
both the home and foreign countries combined:'
B = fDEF - MB
d + fINT (I)
stockofyen-denominated government bonds in pri-
vate portfolios at a rate far surpassing that of
most other major industrial nations since the mid-
seventies. An empirical study ofthe Japanese case
therefore provides some interesting insights into the
complicationscentral banks face in theirattempts to
manage exchange rates.
Section Ipresents a model ofreal (price-adjusted)
exchange rate determination that is later employed
to measure the effectiveness ofJapanese sterilized
intervention operations. The model is a variant of
the "asset market approach" which views the ex-
change rate as an asset price whose value is largely
determined by the relative demand and supply of
asset stocks denominated in various national cur-
rencies and which is prone to large fluctuations as
asset risk-return characteristics are perceived to
change. The foreign exchange market is viewed as
an asset market in this model, with exchange rates
determined not by the balancing of flow demands
and supplies ofcurrencies, but rather by the values
at which the market as a whole is willing to hold the
outstanding stocks of assets.
4 Sterilized inter-
vention can be conveniently analyzed within this
framework because ofits influence on relative bond
supplies.
Section II discusses Japanese foreign exchange
market intervention policy anddescribes the growth
of fiscal deficits in Japan. This provides the back-
ground for an account of the growth of Japanese
government bonds in private portfolios in compar-
ison to the United States. An empirical test of the
model using Japanese-U.S. data from 1973 through
1982 is the subject of the third section. The paper
concludes with a short summary and discussion of
several policy implications.
I. Real Exchange Rate Model
The basic formulation of the real exchange rate
model follows Isard (l980a, 1980b) and may be
viewed as a simplification ofHooper and Morton's
(1982) extension of the sticky-price monetary
model ofexchange rate determination developed by
Dornbusch (1976).5 The focus dependent variable
is the real (price-adjusted) value of the exchange
rate. Because the real exchange rate is a measure of
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domestic and foreign relative prices, it is an impor-
tant factor in determining a country's position in
international competition, and its determinants are
ofspecial policy significance.
The exchange rate equation is derived initially
from the covered interest parity condition. This
condition states that the return on domestic secur-
ities must equal the return available on (equallyrisky) foreign securities once investors have cov-
ered their open positions (and hedged against ex-
changerisk) by forward marketpurchases orsales:
6
Equation (4) is a condition which will hold in
internationally integrated financial markets with
rational behavioron the part ofinvestors. Itsimply
states that the market expectation ofdomestic cur-
rency depreciation overa given period will be equal
where: R = domestic nominal interest rate over
maturity t
R* = foreign nominal interest rate over
maturity t
S = spot exchange rate (domestic price
offoreign currency)
F = forward exchange rate
In logform, (2) may be expressed as (3)
where r = log (I + R), r* = log (I + R*.), s = log S
and f = 10gF
Theexpected yielddifferential between domestic
and foreign bonds is the difference between the
forward rate and the future spot rate, 7 cf> e = f - se.
To see this, we may substitute f = cf>e + se into (3)
and solve for the expected yield differential: cf>e = r
- [r* + (se - s)]. The return on domestic bonds is
given by the domestic interest rate (r) and the return
on foreign bonds is givenby the foreign interest rate
(r*) plus the expected percent appreciation of the
foreign currency, se - s. The forward rate will
generally not equal the expected future spot rate cf> e
i= 0 (and expected yields on government bonds
denominated in different national currencies will
generally not be equal), ifinvestors view the bonds
as imperfect substitutes. A simple model relating
the yield differential to government bond supply
and demand is developed below.
Rearranging and substituting the yield differen-





pe = p + 7T
qe = se _ (pe _ p*e).
where: q = real exchange rate (log)
qe = expectedfuture real exchange
rate (log)
p = domestic price level (log)
p* = foreign price level (log)
pe = expected future domestic price
level (log)
p*e = expected future foreign price
level (log)
Equations (5) and (5') are both identities and
differ only in that (5') is an ex ante relationship
based on market expectations of future spot ex-
change rates and of future domestic and foreign
pricelevels. The real exchange rate measuresdevia-
tions from purchasing power parity, that is, the
extent to which the nominal exchange rate moves
beyond simple adjustment to relative price shifts.
Expected future price levels may now be disag-
gregated into their current price and expected infla-
tion components,
q = s - (p - p*)
to the interest differential between domestic and
foreign securities overa similarholding period, less
any expected yield differential.
It is convenient to think of the future expected
exchangerate as linked to thecurrent spotexchange
rate through the interest differential. Equation (4')
illustrates this relationship. A given interest differ-
ential (including <p
e
) is consistent with any given
spot exchange rate level, and only indicates the
expected change in the (log) level of the exchange
rate over the maturity of the bonds in question.
Once expectations about the expected future spot
rate are identified, however, the spot rate is deter-
mined at a given level. The link between thecurrent
(spot) price of a currency and its expected future
price is hence quite strong, as it is in the case ofany
asset price.
To show that (4') holds in real (price-adjusted)
terms as well as nominal, we define the real ex-
change rate (q) and expected future real exchange
rate (qe) as the difference between the nominal
exchange rate and current and expected future rela-








s = (r* - r) + cf>e + se
se - S = r - r* - cf> e
r=f-s+r*
f-s=r r*
(l + R) = (F/S) (I + R*)
30where 1T = In (l + p), 1T* = InO + p*), and p, p*
equal the expected percent change in the domestic
and foreign price levels, respectively. Substituting
(5) - (6') into (4') then gives the basic real ex-
change rate identity:
This equation expresses the real exchange rate as
a function of domestic and foreign real interest
rates, the yield differential, and the expected future
real exchange rate. Up to this point, we have made
no behavioral assumptions about the way expecta-
tions are formed, and have derived (7) by manipu-
lating the covered interest arbitrage condition,
introducing the definition ofthe real exchange rate
and disaggregating the expected future price level
into its current price and expected inflation compo-
nents. The formation ofexpectations regarding the
future real exchange rate and the yield differential
need to be identified, however, before the model
can be implemented.
Expected Equilibrium Real Rate
Among the more important influences ofexpec-
tations about future real exchange rates (qe), is the
market's perception of a sustainable balance of
payments. The ~urrent account of the balance of
payments is perhaps the most logical choice as a
measure of external equilibrium from an asset
market view ofexchange rate determination. This is
because the current account equals the difference
between the sale of domestic goods and services
(and net transfers) to foreigners and the purchase of
foreign goods and services by domestic residents.
Wheneverthecurrentaccountdoes notequalzero, a
nation exports more or less than it imports. In the
absence of official reserve flows, the current
account imbalance reflects the net accumulation
(current account surplus) or decumulation (current
account deficit) ofprivate domestic resident claims
on foreigners. It is in this sense that a sustainable
long-run·current account must be consistent with
the rate offoreign asset accumulation ordecumula-
tion desired by private investors (both foreign and
domestic) in the long-run. Ifan unexpected current
account surplus or deficit arises, some adjustment




This relationship assumes that all changes over
period t in the expected future long-run real ex-
change rate are unexpected, and that no time trend,
and hence predictable element, is discernable dur-
ing the period under investigation. Market partici-
pants thus employ all available current account
information in theirformation ofexpectationsabout
the future real exchange rate, and only additional
information imbedded in the unexpected compo-
nent of the contemporaneous current account will
cause them to revise their expectations. We are, in
effect, assuming that market participants form their
expectations "rationally," but we limit the set of
relevant information upon which they base their
expectations to the current account.
Integrating (8) from an initial period to the
present gives the level of the expected long-run
future real exchange rate at a point in time t as a
function of unexpected cumulative current account
developments:
It is assumed that the (log) level ofthe expected
future real exchange rate, qe, may be expressed as a
simple linear function of the cumulative sum of
unexpected current account developments:
9
Yield Differential Determinants
The expected yield differential is of particular
importance because it is through this channel that
qe = f g[CA'(t)] dt
path moving towards its long-run sustainable value.
The real exchange rate is a major component in the
current account adjustment process because it re-
flects the relative price between domestic and for-
eign goods and services. An unexpected current
account surplus or deficit, to the extent that it is
considered permanent, is therefore assumed to indi-
cate to market participants that a real exchange rate
shift may be necessary to return the current account
back to its sustainable level orpath.8
This process may be formalized by stating the
change in the expected long-run future real ex-
change rate (dqe) as a function of unexpected cur-
rent account movements or"surprises" (CN) over
period t:
dqe = g[CN(t)] dt
(7)
(6') pe* = p* + 1T*
q = (r* - 1T*) - (r - 1T) + cPe + qO
3\foreign exchange market intervention influences
the exchange rate. The yield differential is deter-
mined by the interaction ofdemand and supply for
assets in both home and foreign countries. Under
certain assumptions, it may be expressed as a func-
tion of the relative supply of government bonds,
relative wealth, the perceived exchange rate risk
associated with holding foreign bonds, the degree
ofinvestorrisk aversion and the currency''habitat"
preferences ofinvestors (Dornbusch, 1980).
For the purpose of empirical estimation, we
assume a simple bond demand function similar to
Frankel (1982) to derive the yield differential deter-
minants.
1O Total private demand for domestic gov-
ernment bonds (B) is the sum of domestic private
demand (Bd) and foreign private demand (Br). The
domestic and foreign demand functions, in tum,
may be expressed as a proportion (f3) ofdomestic
and foreign wealth invested in domestic govern-
ment bonds:
(15)
where Wd(Wr) is domestic (foreign) wealth and
f3d(f3r) is the proportion of domestic (foreign)
wealth devoted to domestic government bonds. By
assuming that f3d and f3r are simple linear functions
ofthe expected yield differential, that is,
f3d = ad + b cf>e and f3r = ar + b cf>e, we may write
(II) and (12) as:
where ad' ar are the desired percentages of total
domestic and foreign wealth, respectively, held in
domestic government bonds independently of
expected relative yields, and bcf>c measures the pro-
portion of wealth devoted to domestic bonds in
response to differential yields. This formulation
assumes that domestic and foreign demand for
domestic government bonds, measured as a percen-
tage oftotal wealth, differs only by a constant term
which is presumably higher in the domestic country
because domestic investors prefer the home cur-
rency "habitat."
To close the model we need to introduce the
foreign bond market and develop demand functions
Bd = f3dWd
Br = f3rWr
Bd= (ad + bcf>e)Wd






analogous to (13) and (14). We do so by defining
wealth as total holdings ofbonds, both foreign and
domestic. Domestic wealth (foreign wealth) rele-
vant for portfolio choice in this model thus consists
of domestic resident (foreign resident) holdings of
both domestic and foreign bonds. This implicitly
assumes that investors first allocate a portion of
their total wealth to total bond holdings, and then
decide between foreign and domestic bonds. This
assumption, though restrictive, allows us to drop
the foreign bond demand functions explicitly, and
to infer the percentage of domestic and foreign
residents' wealth devoted to foreign bonds directly
fromf3d andf3r. Forexample, the percentageoftotal
domestic wealth, so defined, invested in foreign
bonds equals one minus the percentage ofdomestic
wealth invested in domestic'bonds, (1-f3ct).
W can now define total "world" wealth as W =
Wd + Wr; sum (13) and (14) to get total domestic
bonddemand (B = Bd+ Br); and solve for theyield
differential:
cf>e = ~ {(B)}- (ad - ar) {(Wd)}- ~
b W b W b
From (I) and (15), it is apparent that a domestic
bond sale either to finance a home-country budget
deficit, or to finance foreign-currency support ex-
change market intervention, will increase the sup-
ply of domestic currency denominated bonds in
private portfolios and, consequently, increase their
expected relative return (that is, increase the yield
differential), ifinvestors view the bonds as lessthan
perfect substitutes (b =/= (0). This will immediately
depreciate the exchange rate through (7) in our
model. The larger the degree of substitutability
between foreign and domestic bonds, that is, the
largerthe value ofb, the smallerwill be the increase
in the yield differential, and hence, the effecton the
exchange rate, ofany given change in relative bond
supply. An increase in domestic wealth relative to
total wealth, on the other hand, will increase the
relative demand for domestic bonds (assuming that
domestic investors display a greater preference for
home securities than do foreign investors, thatis, ad
> ar) and lower the yield differential. This will
appreciate the value ofthe domestic currency.
Real Exchange Rate Equation
Substituting the expected equilibrium real ex-
change rate determinants (10) and yield differentialdetenuinants (15) into the basic real exchange rate
equation (7), and rearranging, gives the model to be
estimated in SectionIIIofthis article:
q = bo + b l (r*-7T*) + b2 (r-7T)+ b3 (B/W)
+ b4 (Wd/W) + bs (2:eA') (16)






Equation (16) expresses the real exchange rate as
a function of foreign and domestic real interest
rates, the proportionofdomestic government bonds
in total wealth, the proportionofdomestic wealth in
total wealth and the cumulative sum ofcurrent ac-
count surprises. The real exchange rate will depre-
ciate (that is, increase) with a rise in the foreign real
interest rate, and appreciate with a rise in the home
real interest rate. The size of the real interest rate
coefficients (bl and b2) equal, in theory, the tenu to
maturity (in years) of the foreign and domes-
tic bonds whose interest rates are included in the
equation. For example, a one percentage point in-
crease in the five-year domestic bond rate (ex-
pressed at annual rates), ceterius paribus, should
immediately appreciate the real exchange rate by
five percent. The exchange rate appreciation keeps
expected relative yields unchanged by creating an
expected home currency depreciation of approxi-
mately one percent annually over the five-year
maturity ofthe domestic bond. Unexpected current
account surpluses in the home country (bs), on the
other hand, will appreciate the domestic currency,
as market participants perceive a shift in the tenus
oftrade necessary to return the current account to a
sustainable long-run equilibrium position.
An increase in the share ofdomestic government
bonds in total wealth, otherthings being equal, will
depreciate the home currency as investors demand a
higher yield to absorb the bonds into their port-
folios. Holding interest rates and the future ex-
pected real exchange rate constant, the increased
yield may come about through an exchange rate
depreciation. An increase in the share of domestic
wealth in total wealth, on the other hand, will in-
crease the relative demand for domestic bonds and
appreciate the exchange rate, ceterisparibus.
This process can be explained in intuitive tenus
as the macro-economic adjustment process set in
motion from domestic disturbances that work par-
tially through the foreign exchange market. In this
case, the disturbance is an increase in domestic
governmentbonds which necessitates an increase in
their expected relative return. Part of this adjust-
ment may be reflected in higher relative interest
rates in the home country, and part may come about
through an increase in the expected appreciation of
the domestic currency. The increase in the expected
appreciation ofthe currency may come about by an
immediate spot depreciation beyond any drop in
expectation regarding the future equilibrium rate
(which is determined by the long-run current ac-
count equilibrium condition). This then sets up a
greater appreciation of the home currency, or less
ofa depreciation, than was expectedbefore the sale
of a domestic bond, either to finance a domestic
budget deficit or to finance foreign-currency sup-
port intervention (purchases of foreign bonds with
domestic bonds). 12
U. ExchangeMarketIntervention and Budget DeficitFinance in
Japan
The real exchange rate model outlined above,
with its focus on the influence of privately held
government bonds and financial wealth on the ex-
change rate, is particularly appropriate for an anal-
ysis of.the Japanese experience since the mid-
1970s, Onthe one hand, Japan's large fiscal deficits
and active exchange market intervention policy
have combined to increase greatly the supply of
Japanese government bonds in private portfolios 13
33
relative to other major industrial nations. On the
other hand, the surplus ofJapanese private savings
over investment during the last decade has meant
that financial wealth in Japan available for portfolio
investment has also grown at a more rapid rate than
most otherindustrial nations.
Table 2 gives two measures of the Bank of
Japan's foreign exchange market intervention in
relation to changes in the yen-dollar exchange rateover the course of the floating rate period. The
intervention proxies are gross changes in official
Japanese reserves (less gold) and changes in the
Japanese foreign exchange funds account.
14 By
either measure, Japanese intervention in foreign
exchange markets is significant and the Bank of
Japan is generally recognized as among the most
active ofthe central bank participants in the foreign
exchange markets. During 1982, for instance,
Japan lost almost $5 billion in foreign exchange
reserves in an attempt to slow the slide of the yen
against the dollar. Theforeign exchangefunds mea-
sure suggests that the Bank of Japan sold $8.9
billion (net) foreign exchange during 1982. Further-
more, Japan in the past has gained or lost similar
amounts ofinternational reserves in a single quarter
in its foreign exchange operations. The sharp drop
ofthe yen following the oil price shock in the fourth
quarter of 1979, for instance, was met with strong
yen-support operations by the Bank ofJapan and a
$5 billion decline in official reserves. The foreign
exchange funds account indicates that the Japanese
sold $6.2 billion in foreign exchange during the
quarter.
The Bank of Japan has generally followed a
"leaning against the wind" intervention policy,
that is, it usually sells yen when it appreciates and
buys yen when it depreciates. This is indicated by
the figures in the table. Japanese reserves generally
fall when the yen is depreciating and rise when it is
appreciating, and the Bank ofJapan both buys and
sells large amounts offoreign exchange over a per-
iod ofseveral quarters. Empirical evidence derived
from estimating the Bank of Japan's foreign ex-
change market intervention functions also supports


























Official JapaneseForeign Exchange Market Intervention:
Reserve Change, Foreign Exchange Funds and Exchange Rate Change
Gross Change in1 Foreign Exchange2 Percent Change in3
Official Reserves Funds Account Yen-Dollar
(less gold) Exchange Rate
(Billion Dollars) (Billion Dollars) (Yen Depreciation(+»




6.3 7.7 - 3.8%
-1.9 1.1 - 7.0%
1.9 2.9 12.7%






4.1 2.4 - 4.5%




0.2 1 1 5.4%





Notes: (I) Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics
(2) BankofJapan, EconomicStatistics Monthly; converted to dollars with period average yen-dollar exchange rate.
(3) Period average yen-dollarexchange rate.
34Bank of Japan bought (sold) U.S. $160 million in
foreign currencyinthe currentmonth in response to
a one-percent appreciation (depreciation) ofthe yen
against the dollar during the March 1973-0ctober
1976 period. Argy (1982) calculates a somewhat
stronger response (U.S. $210 million) for a given
percent change in the effective (trade-weighted)
value of the yen over the March 1973-December
1979 period. Policy statements by Japanese central
bank officials do not refute these findings. 15
One implication ofthe Japanese leaning-against-
the-wind intervention policy, however, is that,
while it may influence relative government bond
supplies in the short-term, it will have little effect
overextended periods as intervention on either side
of the market is eventually reversed. This suggests
that month-to-month and perhaps, quarter-to-quar-
ter, changes in the yen exchange rate may be influ-
enced by Japanese intervention policy through this
channel, but that longer-term effects are probably
small. This is, of course, the intent of a leaning-
against-the-wind policy-to slow, but not to
reverse, exchange rate movements in the hopes of
reducing exchange volatility, while not hindering
longer-term trends.
Table 3 illustrates the development of Japanese
general government budget deficits, as a percent of
GNP, in comparison to the U.S. and Germany. The
rapid growth of these deficits and their large size,
both by historical standards in Japan and relative to
the U.S. , Germany and othermajorindustrial coun-
tries, is a fairly recent phenomenon.
Japanese government budget deficits surged in
the mid-1970s, as Table 3 demonstrates. The rising
fiscal deficits are attributable to both cyclical and
structural developments in the pattern of revenues
and expenditures. On the revenue side, the 1974-
1975 recession in Japan brought on acyclical short-
fall in government revenues, more so than in most
industrial countries, because Japan is highly depen-
dent on corporate taxes, and consequently highly
variable corporate profits, for its tax revenue. The
structural problem on the revenue side is that the
Japanese income growth rate, and hence, the
growth of tax receipts, has slowed substantially
since 1973.
Table 3
International Comparison ofGeneral Government
Fiscal Balance, 1972-81
(In percentofGNP)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981
Japan I
Receipts 22.1 24.0 25.1 23.1 24.0 24.7 26.5 27.2 28.7 30.0
Disbursements 21.8 21.9 25.0 26.7 27.5 28.8 30.7 31.7 32.7 33.7
Balance 0.3 2.1 0.1 - 3.6 - 3.5 4.1 - 4.1 - 4.4 - 4.0 3.7
UnitedStates2
Receipts 31.4 31.5 32.2 30.6 31.3 31.6 31.5 31.6 31.8 32.6
Disbursements 31.7 31.0 32.5 34.9 33.5 32.5 31.5 31.1 33.1 33.5
Balance 0.3 0.5 - 0.3 - 4.2 - 2.1 0.9 0.6 - 1.3 1.0
Germany2
Receipts 38.7 41.2 41.5 40.8 42.3 43.5 43.3 42.9 42.8
Disbursements 39.2 40.0 42.9 46.6 45.9 45.9 46.0 45.8 46.3

















On the expenditure side, the government sector
in Japan has grown rapidly in recent years, led by
increases in social security benefits, social assis-
tance grants, and interest on the public debt. These
developments have increased the size of general
government expenditures from its historically small
percentageofGNPto a ratio approximatelyequal to
that ofthe U.S. in 1981-33 percent.
The net result of these developments is that the
government began issuing "deficitfinance" bonds
in 1975 to cover the shortfall in revenues over
current expenditures. The amount ofdeficit-finan-
cing bonds issued by the government increased
rapidly from 1975 through the remainder of the
decade. Total government bond issues as a percent
of both general account expenditure and GNP
peaked in fiscal 1979-80. These developments have
correspondingly spurred the growth of Japanese
government bonds held privately. The ratio ofout-
standing government bonds to GNP increased in
Japan from 6% to 36% from the end of fiscal
1974/75 to the end of 1982/83. In less than a
decade, Japan moved from having a ratio of(central
government) outstanding bonds to GNP that was
among the lowest in industrial countries to one that
was among the highest. Chart 1 illustrates the




Less General Government Fiscal
Deficit, 1972-80
(percentofGNP)
1972 1975 1978 1980
Japan 31.7 25.7 24.9 24.9
United States 15. I 12.8 17.3 15.3
Gennany :2L0 16.0 18.1 17.3
Notes: Calculated as gross private savings less general budget
deficit. as percent ofGNP Japan data is for fiscal year;
U.S. and Gennan data covercalendar years.
in private portfolios in comparison to the U.S. over
the last decade.
Another reason the model developed above is
particularly relevant for the Japanese case is that it
explicitly accounts for the influence of relative
financial wealth on the exchange rate. Japanese
financial wealth, similar to government debt, has
grown at a rapid pace over the last decade, and at a
rate much faster than that of other major industrial
nations. 16 This phenomenon is due both to the high
private savings rate in Japan, which has continued
unabated overthe decade, and the sharp drop in the
growth of Japanese private domestic investment
since the 1973 oil-price shock. The combination of
the two factors has resulted in a large increase in
Japanese financial wealth that has been available to
finance domestic government budget deficits (see
Table 4) as well as to exportcapital (through current
account surpluses) to the rest ofthe world over the
greater part of the period. One advantage of the
present model is that it allows us to identify the
separate int1uences ofrelative wealth from relative
bond supply on the real exchange rate.
While it is true that the rapid growth offinancial
wealth in Japan has largely "filledin" thefinancing
requirements of government budget deficits, it is
nevertheless useful to look at the pa..rtial influenceof
each variable on the exchange rate. 17
IU. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results from
testing the two-country real exchange rate model
given by equation (16) with monthly data for Japan
and the U.S., over the 1973-82 period of floating
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exchange rates. Long-term real interest rates are
used as the interest rate variable in the model be-
cause expectations ofthe future real exchange rate,
qC, are based on an equilibrium current accountcondition that will hold only in the long run. 18
The real value ofthe yen/dollar in log form (q) is
calculatedas the log ofthe spot yen/dollarexchange
rate less the log of the Japanese wholesale price
index plus the log of the U.S. wholesale price
index. Long-term real interest rates (rl,) are con-
structedfrom the nominal interest rate on long-term
governmental securities less a two-year centered
moving average of the monthly percent change in
the consumer price index. 19. Japanese government
bonds held privately (Bj) is measured by total
Japanese national government debt, net ofBank of
Japan and government agency holdings.
"World" financial wealth (W) is calculated as
the sum ofU.S. base money, U.S. national govern-
ment debt privately held, Japanese base money and
Japanese national government debt privately
held.
20 Japanese financial wealth (Wi) is calculated
as the sum of Japanese national government debt
privately held, Japanese base money, and the cumu-
lative sum ofJapanesecurrent account surplus from
March 1973, the beginning ofthe floating rate per-
iod in Japan. Bj/W and wj/W state total Japanese
privately held bonds and financial wealth, respec-
tively, as a percent oftotal financial wealth. 21
The current account surprise variable is the cum-
ulative sum of the residuals from the equation re-
gressing the difference in the Japanese and U.S.
current account (JCA-USCA) on six of its lagged
values and three lagged values ofthe real exchange
rate.
Estimation results are given in Table 5. Column
(4) of the table shows the fully specified model
given by equation (16), and columns (1)-(3) show
the sensitivity ofthe coefficient estimates to drop-
ping particular variables from the regressions.
Turning to column (4), all of the signs ofthe vari-
able coefficientsconformto theoretical predictions,
and are significant at the 90% level ofconfidence or
higher with the exception of the current account
surprise variable. A one percentage point increase
in the Japanese long-termreal interestrate is estima-
ted to appreciate the real value of the yen by 0.77
percent, ceterius paribus. The U.S. real interest
rate estimate is significantly higher than its Japan-
ese counterpart, however, and suggests that a one
percentage point increase will depreciate the yen by
1.35 percent.
The estimates for the yield differential determi-
































Regression EstimatesoftheReal Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate


















Notes: (I) rl, (r~;) is constructed from nominal long-term rates less a twelve month centered moving average ofmonthly percentage
changein theConsumerPrice Index. BJ/W is the ratio ofJapanesenationalgovernmentsecuritiesto "world" privatefinancial
wealth, proxied by the sum of Japanese and U.S. private financial wealth. WYW is the ratio ofJapanese private financial
wealth to world private financial wealth. CA' is the cumulative current account surprise variable. The real yen/dollar rate in
log form is constructed as the log ofthe nominal yen/dollarrate less the log ofthe Japanese Wholesale Price Index (WPI) plus
the log ofthe U.S. WPI index. See statistical appendix fordata sources and complete variable definitions.
(2) All equations are estimated with the Fair technique, with correction for first-order autocorrelation (il) and instruments for ri
and BYW. The t-statistics are in parentheses below each coefficient.
37wealth (WJ/W), suggest that these factors also exert
an important influence on the yen rate. A one per-
centage point increase in the ratio of Japanese
national government debt to total financial wealth
depreciates the real value ofthe yen 1.17 percent. A
one percentage point increase in the ratio ofJapan-
ese financial wealth to total financial wealth, on the
otherhand, appreciates the yen 1.39 percent. Aone
billion dollar unexpected increase in the net Japan-
ese-U. S. current account is estimated to appreciate
the yen by 0.3 percent. This coefficient is not statis-
tically significant, however.
The first three columns in the table show the
results from regressing the real exchange rate on
Japanese and U.S. real interest rates alone (Column
1), real interest rates together with relative debt and
relative wealth (Column 2), and real interest rates
with the cumulative current account surprise vari-
able (Column 3). All ofthe coefficient signs in the
regressions again conform to theory and, in addi-
tion, long-term U.S. interest rates, relative Japan-
ese debt, and relative Japanese wealth are signifi-
cant at the 90% level ofconfidence or higher. The
long-term Japanese real interest rate, however, only
becomes significant when relative debt and relative
wealth are included in the regression. The cumula-
tive current account surprise variable, in contrast, is
only significant when these variables are excluded.
Overall, the regressions lend some support to the
real exchange rate model. Considering the length of
the period under investigation, and the great deal of
volatility the real yen-dollar rate has experienced,
the results may be viewed in a favorable light. Of
particular interest for our purposes is that relative
debt and relative wealth both enter significantly in
the regressions, and that the Japanese real interest
rate only becomes significant with the yield differ-
ential determinants included. This indicates thatthe
Japanese real interest rate is an important determi-
nant ofthe real exchange rate, but that its influ~nce
can only be measured when the model is fully speci-
fied and other factors (relative debt and relative
wealth) are held constant.
To get a rough idea ofthe policy significanc¢of
the Bj/W coefficient estimate, consider the size of
the coefficient in relation to the total stocks<()f
Japanese government debt and total financial
wealth. For December 1982 values, a one percen-
tage point increase in the ratio ofJapanese debt to
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total wealth would entail a U.S. $13.28 billion
increase in Japanese governmentbonds outstanding
in private portfolios (assuming financial wealth
remains unchanged). This increase causes an esti-
mated 1. I percent depreciation in the real value of
the yen.
Acomparisonofthis figure to the recentJapanese
budget deficit was 10,853 billion yen in 1982, or
approximately U.S. $43 billion calculated at the
period average yen/dollar exchange rate. At given
financial wealth and Japanese real interest rates, the
floatation of these additional government bonds to
finance this revenue shortfallwouldhave causedthe
real value of the yen to depreciate by an estimated
31 /2 percent overthe course ofthe year.
Turning to Japanese intervention, the yen was
generally weak in comparison to the dollar through
most of 1982 and, in response, the Bank of Japan
bought yen and sold dollars in the Tokyo foreign
exchange market. Assuming that the BankofJapan
sold between $5-$9 billion in foreign exchange
over the year, the estimates suggest that this would
have appreciated the yen during the year by less
than one percent in real terms holding other factors
unchanged.
These examples serve to illustrate the large sums
involved ifJapan wishes to influence the real value
of the yen through sterilized intervention opera-
tions. The sums are large because existing stocks.of
government bonds in private portfolios are large,
and very large purchases orsales ofthese assets are
involved in bringing about a significant change in
their relative supply. The examples also point out
that the large financial requirements of the central
government have caused new bond issues to domi-
nate the limited domestic bond purchases by the
Bank ofJapan needed to finance yen-support inter-
vention operations in 1982. More generally, in the
Japanese case, it appears that the influence ofsteril-
ized intervention on the movements in the yen-dollar
real exchange rate since the mid-seventies has
probably been small. In addition, sterilized inter-
vention may become even less effective as an
independent policy instrument. In the face oflarge,
and rapidly growing, privately held stocks ofgov-
ernment bonds, it may take an enormous amountof
sterilized intervention to influence the exchange
rate.
Some words ofcaution regarding the interpreta-tion of these results are in order. First, while the
model appears to perform well overall by standard
goodness-of-fit(R
2
) measures, ithasonly moderate
success in tracking some of the more dramatic
swings in the real valueoftheyen. Thisis illustrated
in Chart 2 which shows actual and predicted values
ofthe real yen value (log) from the fourth regression
(Column 4) in Table 5.
22
A secondpointconcerns the coefficientestimates
on the real interest rate variables. Both coefficients
are substantially less (in absolute value) than theory
suggests should be the case for long-term interest
rates. In addition, the Japanese real interest rate
coefficient is significantly less than that ofthe U.S.,
whereas theory predicts coefficient values roughly
equal in absolute value. These shortcomings in the
empirical estimates are important because.interest
rates play a central role in our model of exchange
rate determination. Both the generally low coeffi-
cient values and the asymmetry between Japanese
and U.S. variables shed some doubt on the plausi-
bility of the underlying model. On the other hand,
the inherent difficulties in measuring expected
long-term inflation in both Japan and the U.S. may
explain these apparent inconsistencies.
Third, and perhaps most important, the model's
estimates only measure the direct or partial influ-
ence of relative debt on the exchange rate. To the
extentthat additional bond issues increase domestic
real interest rates, the exchange rate will tend to
appreciate in value, and, thereby, offset some ofthe
initial downward pressure on the currency. That is,
budget deficits may cause real interest rates to rise
and appreciate the domestic currency. This consti-
tutes an indirectchannelthrough which govemment
Chart2
Real Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate
Log Scale
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bond issues may influence the exchange rate, and it
will work against the direct effect channeled
through the risk premium.
But, while the linkbetween real interest rates and
real exchange rates is well-documented, there is
only scant evidence of a predictable link between
government bond supplies and real interest rates. In
the Japanese case, a recent empirical study by
FukaoandOkubo (1982) appears to refute the hypo-
thesized positive link indirectly when it found no
evidence ofsuch a link between government bonds
outstanding and nomina/long-term interest rates.
One explanation for their finding may be, as the
theory presented here suggests, that the foreign
exchange market absorbs some ofthe initial impact
resulting from government bond issues in Japan. In
the short run, the yen exchange rate is clearly more
flexible than Japanese long-term interest rates, a
reason being that Japanese long~term interest rates
have been subject to fairly rigid government con-
trols. until recent years. Because ofthis rigidity,
the exchange rate may be the channelthroughwhich
relative yields adjust to reach a new equilibrium
following a shift in relative government bond
supplies. The empirical results do not refute this
hypothesis.
ParameterShift
The Japanese financial system has undergone a
process ofrapid liberalization in recent years
23 that
has included the deregulation of interest rates and
relaxation ofcapital controls. These developments
suggest that Japanese and U.S. government securi-
ties. have probably been viewed by investors as
bettersubstitutes duringthe latterpartofthe sample
period than previously, making the yield differen-
tial variable less pronounced and its determinants
less important in our exchange rate equation. To
investigate this proposition, we include a test to see
ifthe slope parameters on relative debt and relative
wealth have significantly changed from the 1973:03
-1978: 12 period to the 1979:Ql-1982:12period.The
a priori expectation is that both coefficients are
significantlyless.in absolute value inthe latter per-
iod than in the earlierperiod.
Test results are given in Table 6. Column (2)
presents estimates of the full model with the shift
dummy variables and, for purposes ofcomparison,
column (I) restates previous model coefficientNote: See Notes for Table 4. Dummy variable equals zero for
1973:03-1978:12 period and unity for 1979:01-1982:12.
has only a small effect on the exchange rate.
Through a series ofexperiments simulating a struc-
tural model ofGennan asset markets and prices, he
concluded that the Gennan central bank's "...ability
to influence the exchange rate without altering
monetary conditions is very limited. Itis accurate to
assert that the sterilized intervention considered
above has essentially no effect on the exchange
rate." (p. 24). This conclusion for Gennany is
consistent with the empirical results obtained in the
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estimates. Neither parameter shift is significant at
the 90% level of confidence. However, the esti-
mated coefficients for the earlierperiod do increase
substantially in absolute value-from 1.17 to 1.78
for relative debt and from -1.39 to -1.69 for relative
wealth-and the estimated coefficients in the latter
period approach zero. Both results are consistent
with ourexpectations. The estimatedcoefficients in
the latter period equal -0.48 [1.78 + (-2.26)]for
relative debt and -0.32 (-1.69 + 1.37) for relative
wealth.
These results suggest that the yield differential
variable may have become less important because
ofthe ongoing liberalization ofthe Japanese finan-
cial system. This implies that the relative supply of
government securities and relative financial wealth
will probably have less of an impact on the yen
exchange rate in the future than it had in the past. In
practical tenns, this means that thedirect influence
ofJapanese government budget deficits on the real
exchange rate may be less currently thanwhat the
model estimates suggest was the case during the
greater part of the seventies. It also means, how-
ever, that sterilized intervention as a separate policy
instrument may be even less effective nowthan it
was during the earlier period.
From this viewpoint, aloss in effectivenessofthe
sterilized intervention policy instrulTleIltlTlay have
been a necessary cost associated with the increased
internationalization of the Japanese financial
system. The results are inconclusive, but they do
suggest that even the limited effectiveness of this
policy instrument may overstate its importance.
West Gennany also has generally unregulated
capital flows. Consistentwith the results presented
above, a recent study ofthe German case byObst-
feld (1982) also found that sterilized intervention
VI.. Conclusionsand Policy Implications
This paper has analyzed how' sterilized foreign
exchange market intervention works< within a
simple model of real exchange rate determination.
We demonstrated that thisfonnofiritetvention
changes the relative supply of bonds denominated
in domestic and foreign currency. Itwillonlyinflu-
ence the exchange rate when investors< view the
bonds as imperfect substitutes and relative yields
adjust as a consequence.
Because the central bank does not allow base
moneytochange in response to its foreign exchange
purchases and sales, sterilized interventionmaybe
of limited usefulness as a separate policyinstru-
ment. Nevertheless, the distinction between steril-
ized and monetary intervention is important because
it isolates the direct effects of intervention opera-
tions on the exchange market from those ofmone-
tary policy operations.
40Sterilized intervention has two important limita-
tions in particular. First, while sterilized interven-
tion may influence the relative supply of govern-
ment bonds at the margin, bond issues floated to
finance government budget deficits have played a
predominant role in changing relative bond sup-
plies. In theory, the shift in the relative supply of
bonds is what influences the exchange rate, not
whetherthe source of the change is due to foreign
exchange operations or to finance budget deficits.
Sterilized intervention will shift relative bond
supplies to a greater extent than bond issues to
finance deficits for a given purchase or sale of
domestic bonds (because foreign bonds privately
held will correspondingly increase ordecrease with
central bank domestic bond purchases orsales in the
intervention case). For a given shift, however, the
simple asset model predicts an equal influence on
the exchange rate.
Second, is the related pointthat the central bank's
ability to use sterilized intervention as an effective
policy instrument will be smaller the larger the
outstanding stocks ofgovernment liabilities. Quite
simply, the rapid growth ofgovernmentbonds since
the mid-seventies has correspondingly increased
the amount of sterilized intervention necessary to
bring about agiven exchange rate change (assuming
the elasticity of substitution between foreign and
domestic bonds remains unchanged) in Japan. In
this sense, the central bank must be willing to
commit ever growing resources in pursuit of their
exchange rate objectives.
A simple model ofreal exchange rate determina-
tion, applied to Japanese-U.S. data over the 1973-
82 floating rate period, provided some interesting
results. The empirical results generally support the
theoretical model and suggest that the relative
supply of government bonds has influenced the
yen-dollar real exchange rate. However, the coeffi-
cient estimates also suggest that a very substantial
amount ofsterilized intervention may be necessary
to bring about a.noticeable exchange rate move-
ment. This result is primarily due to the large
existing stocks of Japanese and U.S. government
bonds outstanding. Anothercomplication is that the
Bank of Japan's intervention operations since the
mid-seventies, though sizable by international
standards, have been small relative to Japanese
government bond issues financing budget deficits.
In addition, some tentative evidence indicates that
the effectiveness ofsterilized intervention in Japan
is further limited by the financial market liberaliza-
tion measures implemented in recent years. These
measures have tended to increase the substitutabil-
ity between Japanese and U.S. bonds, and reduces
the effectiveness ofsterilized intervention.
It is difficult to draw strong policy conclusions
about the overall usefulness of sterilized interven-
tion from these results, however. We have used a
very simple model in the analysis, and have identi-
fied only one channel through which sterilized
intervention may influence the exchange rate.
Sterilized intervention may influence the exchange
rate through other channels as well. For example,
sterilized intervention may have a "demonstra-
tion" effect, that is, it may influence expectations
about underlying economic conditions or policies.
This in tum might directly shift the expected future
real exchange rate, qe, and the current rate. In
addition, the results presented here are based on
monthly data while central bank intervention objec-
tives may be of a shorter duration. Japanese inter-
vention, even when sterilized, may have a consid-
erable influence on short-term exchange rates (for
example, daily) that is not picked up by monthly
data.
Nevertheless, these results do support the simple
asset market model ofexchange rate determination
presented here and suggest that the Bank ofJapan's
sterilized intervention operations have had only a
small influence on the yen-dollar real exchange
rate. However, it appears likely that sterilized
intervention will become an even less potent policy
instrument as the Japanese financial system be-
comes·more closely integrated with its western
counterparts.
Data Appendix
Data Sources: International Monetary Fund, lnter- q
national Financial Statistics (lFS); Bank ofJapan,
Economic Statistics Monthly (EMS); U.S. Treasury P
Department, Treasury Bulletin.
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real yen-dollarexchange rate (log) =
log(s)-log(P)+10g(P*);







U.S. Wholesale Price Index, (IFS,
line 63);
Japanese long-tenn real interestrate;
weighted average of5-10 year bond
rates in Japan (Source: FRB Macro-
data library); less expected inflation
(see text for construction ofexpected
inflation)
U.S. long-tenn real interest rate;
IO-year U.S. treasury bonds (Source:
FRB macrolibrary); less expected
inflation (see text for definition)
Japanese national government debt
held privately; equal to total national
government debt less government
and Bank of Japan holdings. Con-
verted to billion U.S. dollars with
period average exchange rate.
Source: ESM Table: "National
GovernmentDebt."
U.S. and Japanese financial wealth
proxy; W=Bj+Bus+Mj+MuS
U.S. central government debt held
privately; calculated as (I) "Esti-
mated Ownership of Public Debt
Securities by private investors-
total privately held" (Table OFS-2)
JCASUM
2:CA'
less (2) "selected U.S. liabilitiesto
foreigners-total, official institu-
tions" (Table IFS-2) less (3) "non-
marketable U.S. Treasury bonds and
notes issued to official institutions
and other residents offoreign coun-
tries" (Table IFS-3). Treasury
Bulletin
BankofJapan Reserve Money, (IFS
line 14); (converted to billion U.S.
dollars with period average ex-
change rate).
U.S. Federal Reserve, Reserve
Money, (IFS line 14);
Japanese financial wealth; wj=
Mj + Bj + JCASUM
cumulative sum ofJapanese current
account from 1973:03 (billion U.S.
dollars) (ESM) plus $11.5 billion
(U.S. liabilities to Japan, 1973:03,
IFS line 9a.d.)
cumulative current account surprise;
cumulative sum of residuals from
regressing Japanese current account
less U.S. current accounton six own
lag values and three q lag values
(from 1973:03).
FOOTNOTES
1. Central banks generally hold their foreign reserve
assets which are used for intervention operations in the
form of government interest-bearing securities, primarily
U.S. Treasury securities, as the dollar is the predominant
intervention currency.
2. Note that MBd created through open market purchases
of government securities does not necessarily equal the
total monetarybase. Base money may be suppliedthrough
central bank loans to commercial banks or through open
market operations using commercial bills, for instance.
3. See Dooley and Isard (1979), p. 5, for a discussion of
this issue.
4. See Mussa (1979) and J. A. Frankel (1981) for convin-
cing arguments in support of an asset market approach as
opposed to the moretraditional "flow" models of exchange
rate determination.
5. Isard (1980a, 1980b, 1982) derives this model in a
similar fashion (in both nominal and real values) and terms
his an "accounting identity" approach because it is based
on an arbitrage condition and several identities. It is also
derived and tested for a weighted average of the dollar's
real value by Hooper (1983). Hooper ignores the risk prem-
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ium in his empirical tests, however.
6. The covered interest rate parity condition, equation (2),
generally holds in Japan oncetransactions costs are taken
into account. See Sea (1981).
7. Theyield differential is usuallycalled the risk premium in
the exchange rate literature. This is because risk adverse
speculators must expect some profit if they are to hold an
uncovered futures contract (and bear the risk associated
with unexpected exchange rate fluctuations) which the
interest rate arbitragers have purchased or sold to hedge
their portfolios againstexchange rate risk.
8. Thiscondition also implicitlysetsthecondition for goods
market equilibrium and has been introduced in this context
by Kouri (1976) and Hooper (1983), amongst others. Note
also that the sustainable long-run current account is
assumed constant in this model.
9. A more complicated function is derived in Hooper and
Morton (1982). They attempt to distinguish between transi-
tory and permanentelements in thecurrent account.
10. The assetdemand function employed here is a simpli-
fication of Frankel's (1982) general approach. Frankelextends the single foreign demand for domestic securities
function developed here into two components: a "focus"
foreign countrydemand function and athird-country inves-
tordemand function.
11. The few studies that have embedded exchange risk
determinants into empirical exchange rate models have
generally employed "abbreviated specificati9ns".(e.g.
Hooper andMorton (1982), p. 45) because of data consid-
erations. These attempts have met with limited success in
modeling the risk premium, however. Misspecification of
the model may be one reason for the generally poorresults
heretof()re. ThiS.model derives the determinantsofthe risk
premium along theUnes of Dornbusch (1980), Dooley and
Isard (1979) and Frankel (1982), and employs this more
complete specification in the exchange rate equationesti-
mates. This formulation presents the risk premium as a
function of both the relative supply of government bonds
demonimated in domestic anf foreign currency and the
international distribution ofwealth among investors.
12. Another explanation of the adjustment process given
changes inrelative assetsuppliesorrelative wealth consid-
ers theraleofprivate capital flows. An increase in domestic
assets at unchanged interest rates, for instance, will
increase the proportion of home securities in private port-
folios beyond the ratio desired by investors. As investors
begin tosell homesecurities in favor offoreign securities in
an attempt to bring portfolios back into balance, the resul-
ting capital outflows from the domestic country puts down-
ward pressure on the exchange rate. Increases in relative
domestic wealth, On the other hand, will shift upward the
demand for home securities, cause an incipient capital
inflow and appreciate the domestic currency. If assets are
considered perfect substitutes, Le., investors do not differ-
entiate between securities donominated in the home and
foreign securities, then neither relative asset supplies nor
relative wealth should influence the exchange rate through
this channel (Le., through the risk premium or "differential
return" channel).
13. This measures Japanese government securities not
held by the Bank of Japan or other Japanese government
agencies (e.g., Trust Fund Bureau, Industrial Investment
Special Account, Postal Life InsuranceandAnnuity). Of the
total government debt held privately in December 1982,
99% was held in long-term instruments (internal bonds-
consisting of construction bonds and deficit-finance
bonds).
14. QUirk(1977)arguesthattheforeign exchangefunds is
the most appropriate proxy for Japanese official interven-
tion because it includes "hidden intervention;' Le., Bank of
Japan foreign exchange deposits with its member com-
mercialbanks, and excludes certain transactions with the
U.S. military in Japan whichare includedInofficialreserve
figures.
15.•See,forinstance, "AJapaneseViewofExchangeRate
Policy" written in.1982 by ShijuroOgata, Bank ofJapan
Executive Director, for Aussenwirtsehalfof the University
ofSt. Gallen.
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16. By the national income accounting identity, it can be
shown thatthe excess of private savings (S) over private
domesticinvestment (I) equals the currentaccountsurplus
(X-M) plusthe governmentbudget deficit (G-T): S-I = (X-M)
+(G- T). Beyond running large governmentbudgetdeficits
(measured either by the central or consolidated general
government accounts), Japan has run a current account
surplus over the greater part of the last decade and has
generally been a net exporter of capital to the rest of the
world.
17. See Hang-Sheng Cheng, "Crowding-Out: Japanese
Experience," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Weekly Letter, March 19, 1982, foran engaging discussion
of the "crowding out" versus "filling-in" issue in the Japan-
ese context. The common opinion expressed by govern-
ment publications in Japan is that there is no evidence of
government credit demands croWding out private invest-
mentthus far, butitisfeared thatit may become a problem
in the future if budget deficits are not reduced. See
EconomicSurveyofJapan 1979/1980.
18. The Fair estimation procedure is employed in all re-
gressions. This is a statistical technique designed to pro-
vide Consistent coefficientestimates of an equation With
both autocorrelated error termsand endogenous explana-
tory variables. Which variablesare assumed endogenous
is particularly important because the empirical results are
sensitive to this choice. Japanese relative bond supplies
and Japanese real interest rates are treated as endoge-
nous variables in the short-run. To the extent that Bank of
Japan reacts to real exchange rate movements in its inter-
vention operations, Japanese bond supply will be correla-
ted with the error term in the. exchange rate equation.
Interest rates in Japan, both nominal and real, may also be
systematically influenced by real exchange movements
and are treated as an endogenous variable in the model
estimation.The instruments for both endogenous explana-
tory variables are formed from the predicted values of a
reduced form equation which includes contemporaneous
and lagged exogenous variables i.n the system(rUS, WVW,
CAS), the lagged endogenous variables (q, B/W, ri) and a
time trend. See Fair (1970).
19. Thisrreasure.is similar to Hooper (1983) and Shafer
and Loopesko (1983).
20. The financial wealth. measure has been broadened
fromthatcJefined in thethaoreticalsection. To private bond
holdings have been added (U.S. and Japan~se) base
money. This adjustmenthas been made to helpdistinguish
better empirically between domestic bond supply and
domesticfinancial wealth.
21. AllJapanese dataused in computing Bi, WandWi are
convertedfrom yento U.S. dollars attheaveragemonth-to-
month yen/dollarexchange rate.
22. A related point concerns the structural stability Of the
exchange rate equationand estimatedcoefficientstodiffer-
entsampleperiods, Changes invariabledefinitions, andthe
choice of estimation technique. Exchange rate modelshave generally had poor out of sample forecasting perfor-
mance in recent years, and have demonstrated significant
structural instability. The results here should therefore be
interpreted with this important qualification in mind.
23. See Charles Pigott's "Financial Reform in Japan," in
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Review, Winter 1983, for a comprehensive review of the
process of liberalization in Japanese financial markets.
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